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Abatract
A generalized (pure exchange) economy consists of a list of agents, utility func-
tions and initial endowments for each agent, and a net trade vector, that describes
the trade between the economy and the outside world. In this paper we extend
the definition of Walras equilibria to generalized economies without free disposal
of commodities. An existence result is presented and we provide two axiomatic
characterizations of Walras allocations based on the axioms of consistency and
converse consistency. Also, a characterization of the utility vectors correaponding
to strictly positive Walras allocations is given. It is shown that the asaumption
of free disposal can, for generalized economies, lead to non-Pareto optimal Walras
allocations.
"I'he authors thank Oscar Volij, Gert-Jan Otten, and Peter Borm for their participation in diacusaiona
Lhat ~wcntually Ir.d to thc idcaa that arc expresacd in thia papcr. Furthcr, wc arc grateful to Nir Dagan,
Ii.yo-Ichi Nagahisa, William '1'homson, and Walter 'lYockel for Lheir helpful commenta on an earlier
veraion oC the paper.
ZDepartment of Econometrics, Tilburg Univeraity, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The
Netherlands.
3C;entER for Economic Research, Tilburg Univeraity, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The
Netherlands.
4Department of Mathematics, the Hebrew Univereity of Jeruealem, 91904 Jerusalem, larael.
SThis author was aupported by the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).1 Introduction
'Phe theory of compe.titive eyuilibria in exchange economies was first formulated in Wal-
ras(1874) and it has bern studied extensivcly since. 'Che existence of Walras equilibria is
the subject of investigation in Armw and Uebmu (1954) (see also McKenzie (1954)), who
provide an existence proof in the general case, and in Mas-Colell (1974), who provided
an existence theorem without assuming completeness or transitivity of preferences. For
a historical survey of the development of the theory of Walras equilibria the reader is
referred to Arrow and Hahn (1971).
'Che, goal of Lhis paper is to axiomatize the Walras correspondence by means of its
consistency properties. "I'he consistency principle unifies important developments in
diverse areas ranging fmm abstract game theoretic models to concrete taxation and ap-
portionment problerns. Various solution concept,s have bee.n charactcrized on the basis
of consistency propcrtics. 'I'his linc of rrwcarcli was inil.iatcd by ,Sobolcv (197~i), who
axiornatized the prenucleolus, and it was followed hy (among othc,rs) Peleg (1985, 1986)
(axiomatizatious oC the core and the pre,keruel), Lensberg (1988) (axiomatization of the
Nash bargaining solution), Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) (axiomatization of the Shapley
value), Peleg and Tijs (1994), Norde et al. (1993), and Peleg et al. (1994) (axioma-
tizations of solutions of strategic games), van Heumen et al. (1994) (axiomatizations
of solutions of Bayesian games), and by Peters et al. (1994) (axiomatizations of the
Kalai-Smorodinsky and the egalitarian bargaining solutions). A survey on parts of this
line of research is provided in Thomson (1990).
The existing attempts to characterize the Walras correspondence may be divided
into three categories the social choice approach, thc indirect approach, and the direct
.~pproac'h.
In Lhe social choice approach the initial endowrnents of the traders are fixcd and,
as a resulL, an exchange economy is completely determined by thc profile of utilities
of its membcrs. Hence, the Walras correspondence can be viewed as a social choice
correspondence and one can use suitable social choice axioms in order to obtain a char-
acterization. Papers that follow this approach are Nagahisa (1991, 1992, 1994), Nagahisa
and Suh (1993), and Cevers (1986). [n the current paper we do not fix the initial bundles
and therefore our approach cannot be placed in this category.
In the indirect approach one attempts to characterize the Walras correspondence by
comparing it to other well-known correspondences or by its implementability properties.
For example, Dagan (1994) characterizes the Walras correspondence as a subcorrespon-3
dence of t,he core which has some additional properties, including consistency and a form
of converse consistency. Ifis proof uses the Debreu and ScarJ(1963) límit theorem. For
a comprehensive list of papers that follow the indirect approach we refer to Thorreson
(198R, section ,5).
The third category consists of papers that deal with the specific properties of the
cornpetitive equilibrium. 'fwo examples are the Thomson (1988, 1992) papers. However,
the first paper deals with competitive equilibria from equal initial bundles, and the second
paper is an exploratory study that mainly contains definitions. 1lence, our results are
not covered by the papcrs of Thomson.
Our approach can be classified as a direct one. In order to deal with a variable
number of agents we use the concept of generalized economies due to Thorrason (1992)
(see also Dagan (1994)). A generalized (pure exchange) economy is a list of agents, utility
functions and initial endowments for each agent, and a net trade vector, that describes
the trade between the economy and the outside world. We focus on Walras allocations,
allocations oí the commodities available that are part of a Walras equilibrium. In order to
guarantee the existence of a Walras equilibrium when there is no trade with the outside
world (i.e. the net trade vector equals 0) we make the standard assumptions that the
initial endowments are strictly positive and that the utility fuctions are continuous,
quasi-concave, and satisCy local non-satiation. In order Lo prove converse consistency of
the Walras correspondence we also assume that the utility functions are smooth.
The paper is organizec} as follows. In section 2 we formally introduce generalized
econornies. 'I'hen, in section 3, we prove that under the assumption that there is no
free disposal of commodities the Walras corresponence is the unique solution that sat-
isfics c.onsistency, convcrsc consist,ency, I'arcto opt,imality for two-agent economies, and
necessity of a rnedium of exchange. 1'he uecessity of a medium oC exchange axiom is a
price oriented e.xchange axiom. It states that for one-agent economies the agent in the
economy maximizes his utility given his budget set with respect to some price vector.
Here, the price vector has to be such that the supply of commodities is equal to the
demand for commodities. We show that this axiom can be replaced by non-emptiness
for one-agent economies if we restrict ourselves to the family oí generalized economies
that have at least one W'alras allocation. Section 4 contains an existence result for Wal-
ras allocations. In this section we provide sufficient conditions on generalized economies
such that there exists at least one Walras allocation. In section 5 we show that the ax-
ioms consistency, Pareto optimality, and non-emptiness suffice to characterize the utility4
vcctors corresponding Lo strictly positivc Walras allocations. hinally, in secaion fi wc
briefly consider how the analysis changes if t,here is free disposal of conunodities.
2 Generalized economies
ln this section we will introduce some notations and definitions.
By R~ we denote the non-negative orthant of R~ and the strictly positive orthant of
R~ is denoted by Rtt. Further, for two vectors x, y E R~ we denote x~ y(x ~ y) if
x- y E R} (x - y E R~~). The inner product xy of two vectors x and y E R~ is defined
i
bY xy - ~i-r 2iyi.
A generalized economy is a list E-(N; (wi)iEN; (ui);EN; 0}, where N (sometimes de-
noted N(F,)) is a non-empty finite set of agents, w` E Rt} is the strictly positive initial
endowment of agent i E N, ui : R} -~ R is the utility function of agent i E N, and
0 E R~ is the net trade vector for the economy, satisfying ~iEN w' i- O 1 0. The com-
modity spacc is Rt, the non-negative orthant of R~. The net trade vector A indicates
how mrrch of each good is imported in the economy and, hence, a good that is exported
from t.he economy will have a negative sign in the vector 0. We will assume through-
out the paper that the utility functions of the agents are continuous, yuasi-conca.ve and
locally non satiated. A utility function u: R~ ~ R is called locally non satiated if
for every comrnodity bundle x E Rt and every open neighbourhood of x there exists
a y E R} that is in this neighbourhood and that has a strictly higher utility than x
(u(y) ) u(x)). The class of all generalized economies with continuous, quasi-concave
and locally non satiated utility functions is denoted by E.
In this paper we opt for discussing economies in which there can be no free disposal
of commodities. [n a concluding section we will briefly discuss the influence of the
possibility of íree disposal of commodities on our results.
An ullocntion in a generalized economy is an assignment of resources to the agents in
the c~c onorny that is a redistribution o[ the resources that are available in the ecouorny.
I~irrmally, denoting A(!.;) for the set of allocations in economy E, we have
A(F') -((x` )iEN ~ x` E Rt for each i E N and ~ x' - ~ w' -~ O1 l iEN iEN
for each E E E. An allocation x-(x`)iEN E A(E) is e,(jïcient or Pareto optirna! for E
if there is no other allocation (y`);EN E A(E) such that ui(y') ? ui(x`) for all i E Nwith st.rict incyuality for at least onc i E N. Ct is casy to provc 6hat cflicicnt allocations
exist since the utility functions oF the agents are continuous and tlie set of allocations is
compact.
We will explain why a net trade vector 0 appears in our economies on the basis of
the concept of a reduced economy, which is important when studying consistency (see
section 3). Let E- ( N; (w');EN; ( u`)iEN; 0} E E be a generalized economy. Let S C
N, S~ l~, and let x E A(F,). The reduced economyof E with respect to S and x is
Es'T - (S; (w~)iES; (u~)iES; e f ~ (w~ - x~))-
iEN`S
'1'he interpretation of the reduced economy Es~s is the following: Suppose the agents
in N agree on the allocation x and the agents in N`S leave the economy with their
respective allocated bundles. Then the agents in S can reconsider their situation, only
uow thcy arc Icft wit.h a net trade obligation of n-}- ~;E~r`S(w' - x') with the outsidc
world. Ilencc, the agcuts is .S are now part of thc reduced economy Is'5~~. Note that even
if Lhe original ecooomy is an ordinary economy ( U - 0), then the reduced economy with
respect to some subset of agents and some alloc;ation will in general have a net trade
vector U ~ 0.
We will show that the reduced economy Es~~ is indeed a generalized economy. Since E
is a generalized economy and (x');EN E A(E), we have ~;EN x~ -~iEN w' -1- O and,
consequently, ~;ES x` -~iES w` f~iEN`S(w' - x`) -b O. But x' E Rt Cor each i E N, so
~;ES x' ~ 0 and therefore
~w'~- IO-F ~ (w'-x')I ~0.
iES ` iEN`S J
Notc thaL wc implicitly proved that (a,');EN E A(E) implics that (x');ES E A(Es'~)
['urther, it is straightforward to check that for F, E ï, (x`)iEN E A(E) and S C T C
N(F,), S~ 0, it holds that Es~~ -(ET~T)s~sT where xT denotes (x`);ET.
Let ïo C tï be a farnily of generalized economies. A solution on E'o is a function ~
which assigns to each economy E E Eo a subset ~(E) of A(E). Examples of solutions
on the class E of generalized economies are the Pareto optimal solution, defined by
1'D(E) -{x E A(E) ~ x is efficient } for all E E E, and the Walnas correspondence,
defined by W(E) - {(x');EN E A(E) ~ there exists a price vector p E 0 such that
x' E D'(p) for each i E N}. Here, 0-{p E R~ ~~~-r p~ - 1} and D'(p) is the demand
set oJ agent i with respect to the prsce vector p defined by D`(p) :- {x` E Rt ~ px' C
pzu' and u'(x') 1 u'(y) for all y E R~ with py c pw'}.fi
Our definitions of the Pareto optimal solution and the Walras correspondence for gener-
alized economics are cxtensions of the usual dc(iuitions for ordinary cconornics (O - 0).
IJsing thc samc lina o( rcasoning as for ordinary cconomic.~s, it cau bc proved that
W(1;') C PO(E) for all generalized econornies G E E, where the inclusion is in gen-
cral a atrict inclusiou. Further, we easily obtain the following result with respect to
Walras allocations.
Proposition 2.1 Let E- (N; (w');EN; (ui);EN; O) be a generalized economy, let x be a
Walras allocation for E(x E W(E)), and let p E 0 be a price vector such that xi E Di(p)
for each i E N. Then it holds that p0 - 0.
Prooj. Because the utility functions of the agents are locally non satiated, it holds that
pxi - pwi for each i E N. Hence, ~;EN px` -~iEN Pw'. Further, because x E A(E), we
have ~;EN 2' -~iEN w' f n and, consequently, p~;EN x' - p(~;EN w' f O). Now, the
proposit,ion follows hy substituting ~;EN Prr` ícrr p~iEN x`~ O
3 Characterizations of the Walras correspondence
In this sect.ion we will provide two axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspon-
dencc based on the axioms of consistency and converse consistency. Both axioms are
defined using the reduced economies inttoduced in the previous se;ction.
A solution ~ on a family of economies Eo is consistent (CONS) if it satisfies the following
condition. If E E Eo, S C N(E), S~ 0, and x E ~(E), then Es~s E So and xs E
~(E'y~s) Our notion of consistency is only slightly different from Dagan's ( 1994) notion.
'1'he diffe.rence is that I)agan puts ES~~ E ïo as a condition, whereas we put it as a
consequence. Therefore, Dagan's notion secros to be weaker at hrst sight. However,
for all farnilies ïo C S that we consider in this paper it holds that Es~s E Eo for all
E E ïo, S C N, S ~ 0, and all x E A(E), so in the context of this paper the two
definitions are equivalent. 'I'he following le,mrna was also proved in Uagan (1994).
Lemma 3.1 The Walras correspondence on t}re class E is consistent.
Pmoj. Let E be a generalized economy, let S C N(E), S ~ 0, and let x E W(E).
We already saw that F,S~s E E. Further, there exists a price vector p E 0 such that
xi E D'(p) for each i E N. Since x E A(E), we know that xs E A(F,S~~). Hence, using
the fact that x' E Di(p) for each i E S, it follows that xs E W(ES'~). ~7
Remark 3.2 Proposition 2.1 implies that the Walras correspondence will often be
empty. Ilowever, it follows by lemma 3.1 and existence of Walras allocatíons for or-
dinary economies (O - 0) that Walras allocatious also exist for all reduced economies of
ordinary econornies wit.h respect to Walras allocations.
Nuw, Iet us definc converse consistency. A solution ~ on a family of generalized cx:onornies
ïo is convcrse r.onsistent (COCONS) if for every E E Eo with at. least two agents
(~N(l;)~ ~ 2) and for every x E A(E) that is eHicient the following condition is satisfied.
If for every S C N(E), S~{~, N(E)}, it holds that Es~s E F,o and xs E~(Ess), then
x E 4(E). Actually, COCONS is very similar to the converse consistency for the strong
Naslr eyuilibrium used in Peleg and Tijs (1994).
The Walras correspondence satisfies converse consistency if we put a smoothness condi-
tion on the utility functions.
A utility function u: Rt -~ R is smooth if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) If x E Rt~, y E R~, and u(x) - u(y), then y E R}}.
(ii) If x E Rtt then there exists a unique price vector p E ~ such that py ~ px for all
y E C(x), where G(x) - {J E R.t ~ u(y) ? u(x)}.
Not.e Lhat conditions 1 and `l imply that u(x) ~ u(y) for all x E Rt} and y E R~.
Smoothne.ss also implies weak monotonicity, i.e. if a utility function u: Rt -r R is
smooth, then u(y) ? u(x) for all x E R} and y E R~} with y 1 x. Further, smoothness
implies that for each generalized economy E E E and each Walras allocation x E W(E)
there exists a unique price vector p E ~ such that x' E D'(p) for each i E N(E).
Lemma 3.3 Let E-(N; (w');EN; (u~)iENi U) be such that u' is smooth for each i E N
and Ict x be a Walras allocation for E. 'fhen there exists a unique price vector p E ~
such that x` E D'(p) for each i E N.
ProoJ. Obviously, there exists at least one price vector p E 0 such that x` E D`(p) for
each i E N, by the defitiition of Walras allocations. To prove uniqueness, let p E 0
be a price vector such that x' E D'(p) for each i E N and fix j E N be fixed. Then,
because u' is locally non satiated px' - pw'. Also, if y E Rt and u~(y) ~ u'(x~),
then p,y 1 pw' - px'. Thus, using continuity of u~, py 1 px~ for all y E Rt such
that ed(y) ~ rd(x'). I~urther, ul(x') 1 u~(w') and w' E R~}. Hence, we know that
x' E Rtt. Now, it follows from condition (ii) of smoothness that p is unique. 0
Let .~ be the family of generalized economies whete the agents have smooth utility
functions. Note that withiu the family .~ we have enough assumptions to guarantee the:i
validity of thc two wclfarc theorems for ordinary econornies. Hencc, if f? E.~ has a net.
tradc~ cector O - 0, thcu thc two wclfarc thcorcnis arc valid (or t.his c~cononry. Furthcr, it
is easily seen that for each economy G E.~, each S C N(E), S~ 0, and x E A(E), the
reduced econorny of E with respect to 5' aud x is a member of the family .~. It follows
that the Walras correspondence is consistent on .F.
The following lemma implies that the Walras correspondence is converse consistent on .P.
Lemma 3.4 Let E- (N; (w');EN; (u');EN; O) E.~ and let x E A(E). Then x is a
Walras allocat.ion for G if and only if x is efficient and x' E W(L'{'}~s) for all i E N.
ProoJ. Clearly, if x E W(E) then x is efficient. Further, by consistency of the Walras
correspondence we know that x' E W( E{'}~T ) for all i E N. Assume now that x is ef6cient
and t.hat x' E W(E{'}~r) for all i E N. Then, for each i E N therc exists a price vector
p' such that x' E D'(p'). Following the proof of lernma 3.3, we sce that p' is the uniyue
price vector such that x' E D'(p).
Now, by our assurnption, x is Pareto optimal in E. Clearly, this implies that x is Pareto
optimal in the ordinary economy (N; (x');EN; (u');EN; 0) (this property will reappear in
section 6 under the narne self-efficiency and we refer to this section for an explanation of
this property). Now, we can apply the second welfare theorem to the ordinary economy
(N; (x');ENi (u')sEN; 0) and we conclude that there exists a p E 0 that supports x' for
each i E N. Therefore, by uniqueness of the prices p' such that x' E D`(p') for each
i E N, we may concludc that p` - p for all i E N. Thus, x is a Walras allocation for E.
Corollary 3.5 The Walras correspondence is converse consistent on the family .~ of
generalized economies.
PmoJ. Let E- ( N; (w');ENi (u')iENi ~) E.~ with ~N~ ? 2 and let x E A(E) be efbcient
and such that for every S C N, S~ {0, N}, it holds that xs E W(ESF). Then, obviously,
x' E W(E{'}~s) for all i E N. Now, by lemma 3.4 it follows that x E W(E). ~
Smoothness of the utility functions is a necessary condition in corollary 3.5 in the sense
that converse consistency may be violated if the utility functions are not smooth.
Dagan ( 1994) also proved that the Walras correspondence satisfies converse consistency.
However, his notion of converse consistency is different from ours. The most important
di(ference betwe~en the Lwo notions is that the notion of Dagan ( 1994) can be applied
only t.o generalized economies wíth more than two agents, whereas ours is also applicable
for two-agent economies because we only consider efficient allocations.(}
In ordcr to characterizc thc Walras corre.. ~spoudcuce wc nee~d two more axioms. A solution
~ on a family of generalized economies Eo satisfies Pareto optimality for lwo-agent gener-
alized economies (PO(2)) if for every two-agent generalized economy E E ïo all x E~(E)
are, efficient. I'urther, QS satisfies necessity of a medium of exchange for one-agent gener-
alized economies (NMEX(1)) if ~(E) - W(E) for every one-agent generalized economy
E E So. The necessity of a medium of exchange axiom can be interpreted as a price
oriented exchange axiom that states that for one-agent economies the agent in the econ-
omy maximizes his utility given his budget set with respect to some price vector such
that the supply of commodities is equal to the demand for commodities.
Using lemma 3.4 and corollary 3.5 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 3.6 The Walras correspondence is the unique solution on .~ that satisfies
NMEX(1), PO(2), CONS and COCONS.
Yroof Clearly, the Walras correspondence satisfies NMEX(1) and PO(2). Further, in
lemma 3.1 and corollary 3.5 we proved that the Walras correspondence satisfies CONS
aud COCONS'. Assurne that ~ is a solution on .~ that also satisfics the four foregoing
axioms and let E-(N; (w'){EN; (T~~)~EN~ ~) be in .F.
If ~N~ - 1, then rb(E) - W(E) by NMEX(1).
If ~N~ -`L, Iet first x E W(l~;). Then x is efficient and, by CONS of the Walras
correspondence, x' E W(I?{'},~) -~(E{~}s) for all i E N. So, by COCONS oí ~ we
know t.hat x E~(E). Now, let x E~(E). By PO(2), x is efficient artd x` E~(E{~},~) -
W(E{'}'T) for all i E N by CONS of ~. Hence, by lemma 3.4, x E W(E).
We proceed by induction on the number of agents in an econorny. Suppose that we
proved f.haL the Walras correspondence and rti coincide for all economies with at most k
agcnts (k 1`l). Now, suppose ~N~ - k f 1.
If x E W(F.), then x is efficient and, by the induction hypothesis, xs E W(Es's) -
~(F,'`''') for cvery S C N, .S' ~{0, N} and by COCONS of ~ it holds that x E ~(F.).
If x E ~(l;), t.hen xti E~(Es~'s) - W(F,s's) for every S S N, S~ N, by CONS oC
~. Note that we cannot apply COCONS of the Walras correspondence, because we
do not know whether x is efficient. Therefore, we proceed in the following way. Ibr
cach i E N it holds that x' is part of a Walras allocation in some reduced econorny
ancí, therefore, t,here is a price vector p` E 0 such that x' E D'(p'). It follows from the
proof of lemma 3.3 that cach p' is uniquc. Wc claim that p` - p' for any two agents i
and j E N, for if p' ~ t~, consider the reduced economy Es'r whcre .S - {i, j}. Since
xs E W(Es'~), there is some price vector p such that both x' E D'(p) and x~ E D~(p).10
'I'hcu, cither p ~ p' or p~ p', which means that either x' or x~ is supported by two
different price vectors, contradicting unicity of the supporting price vectors. Now, we
may conclude that there exists a price vector p such that x' E D'(p) for each i E N. But
this means that x E W(E). ~
Dagan (1994 ) also provides a characterization of tkre Walras correspondence using consis-
tency and converse consistency. Besides the Cact that his notion of converse consistency
is different from ours, t.here is a more important difference betwex~n the two characteri-
zations. Dagan (1994) needs a domain of econornies that includes all economies with a
finite number of agents (variable number of agents), whereas it follows fcom the proof
of theorem 3.6 that we only need a domain that satisfies the condition that for every
economy in the domain all its reduced economies are also in the domain.
In our characterization we can replace the 'necessity of a medium of exchange' axiom by
a'non-emptiness' axiom if we restrict the fanrily of economies.
Lct G be the family of generalized economies where agents have smooth utility functions
and that allow for a Walras allocation, i.e. CJ -{F, E.~ ~ W(E) ~ N}. A solution ~ on
~ satisfies non-emptiness Jor one-agent generalized economies (NEM(1)) if ~(E) ~ 0
for every one-agent generalized economy E E~-
Theorem 3.7 'I'he Walras correspondence is thc unique solution on ('jthat satisfies
Nts'M(1), PO('l), CONS, and COCONS.
ProoJ. Clearly, the Walra.g correspondenc:e satisfies NEM(1), YO(2), and COCONS
on G. Furthcr, it follows from CONS of the Walras correspondence on .~ that for each
econonry E E G, each S C N(E), S~ 0, and a, E W(G), the reduced economy of
I? with respcct to .S and x is a member of the family ('j. It. follows that the Walras
correspondence is consistent, on Q.
Now, Iet ~ be a solution on CJ that also satisfies the four axiorns. If G E~ with
~N(I;)~ - 3, then ~A(E)~ - 1 and, because both ~ and the Walras correspondence satisfy
NEM(1), ~(E) - W(!s) - A(E). This proves that ~ satisfies NMEX(1) on CJ. Now
we can follow the proof of theorern 3.6 and show that ~(E) - W(F,) for all E E~. ~
Remark 3.8 If ~ is a solution on C' j that satisfies PO(2) and CONS, then ~(E) C W(E)
for all E E G.
`Chis remark can easily be proved using the ideas in the proofs of theorems 3.6 and 3.7.
Remark 3.9 "Che axiom COCONS is not re.dundant in the characterization in theo-
rem ;3.7. This can be seen as follows. Let E- (N; (w');EN; (u');Ery; ~) E~. ThenIl
i, j E N are called symmetric if w' - w' and ui - u~. An alloca.Lion x E A(E) satisfies
equal treatment if xi - x' whenever i and j are symmetric. Consider the equal treat-
ment Walras correspondence W~(E) -{x E W(E) ~ x satisfies equal treatment}. This
correspondence satisfies NEM(1), PO(2), and CONS on G. Further, W(E) C W(E),
for each E E~, where the inclusion is in general a strict inclusion.
4 An existence result
In this section we will provide a suf6cient condition on generalized economies such that
there exists at least one Walras allocat,ion.
Let E be a generalized economy where the net trade vector O is such that it has at
least one coordinate that is strictly positive and at least one coordinate that is stricly
negative. "I'his seems to be a reasonable assumption because the case O- 0 is known
and for O ~ 0 t.hat are strictly positive or strictly negative we have non-existence when
there is only one agent in the economy. We will compactify the consumption sets of
the agents and provide conditions on the compactified economy that are sufficient for
the existence of Walras allocations. Existence of Walras alloca.tions for the generalized
economy then follows by weak monotonicity of the utility functions.
I.et p E Rf and let EP be the economy which is obtained from E when the consumption
sets of the agents are replaced by the cube QP - {x E R~ ~ x~ G p for all j E{1, ..., 2} }.
Assume that p is large enough, so that ~;EN w' and ~;EN w` ~ O are interior points of QP.
For p E 0 and i E N denote by D'P(p) the demand set of agent i with respect to the price
vector p, i.e. nP(p) :- {x' E Qo ~ px' C Pwi and u'(x') ? u'(y) for all y E Qp with py G
pwi }. I~or p E 0 denote by z(p) -~;EN I~o(P) -~iEN w' - O, the excess demand
correspondence of EP at p. Also denote Gt -{j ~ O~ ~ 0} and 1,- -{j ~ O~ G 0}. Note
that both Lt and G- are non-empty. Further, suppose that the following condition is
satisfiecL for all p E 0 there exists a~ E z(p) such that ~O - 0 and
C; c ~i
~i - U~
for all i E G- and all j E Lt. This condition is rather strong, but this is not surprising,
because it is rarely satisfied that there exist Walras allocations if the net vector 6 is not
equal to 0.
Theorem 4.1 If all t}~e conditions above are satisfied, then Eo has a Walras allocation.11
ProoJ. For p E ~ let z'(p) be the set of all ~ E z(p) that satisfy the conditions mentioned
above, i.c. z'(p) - {~ E z(p) ~~(~ - 0 and é C é for all i E G- and j E G}}. Then
the mulLifunction z' has non-ernpty and convex values and it is upper semi-continuous.
Now, Iet A C lir be such tlydt UyEO z'(p) C A. We may choose A to bc, convex ancí
compacL. For r; E A we define
J(~)-{qE~s~9~?9~forallqEDe},
where De -{q E 0 ~ q0 - 0}. Then the multifunction J has non-empty convex values
and it is upper semi-continuous.
Since both z' and J are non-empty and convex valued upper semi-continuous multifunc-
tions, the multifunction h defined by h(p,~) - J(~) x z'(p) for (p,~) E ~ x A, has a
fixed point (p,~) E J(~) x z'(p). We will show that S- 0, which implies that Eo has a
Walras allocation.
I3ecause p E j(~) C DA, we know that p0 - 0 and p~ ? q~ for all q E De- Further,
since ~ E z`(p), we know by local non satiation that p~ - p0. Hence, 0~ q( for all
q E pH. Defining r--é ~- é, it is easily seen that ~~-é e' ~ ee~) E De, for al]
i E l,- and j E L}. Ilencc, qrï G 0 for all q E ~e irnplics in particular Lhat 0 J-H ~- H
for all i E 1.- and j E Lt. Ilowcvcr, ~ E z'(jr) rrnplreg Á 1 Á for i E L- and j E L}.
Wc cuncludc t,hat H- H for all i E l.- and j E hf. Ilence, ~- kO for some k E R.
13ecause ~ E z'(p), it holds that ~O - 0 and, hence, we conclude that k- 0 and,
consequently, ~ - 0. 0
Now, let E E.E be a generalized economy where the agents have smooth utility functions
and let, p E R} be such that the conditions in theorem 4.1 are satisfied. Then it follows
by weak monotonicity of the utility functions that W(EP) C W(E) and, hence, using
theorern 4.1 we see that the set oí Walras allocations for E is non-empty.
5 A characterization of the Walras utilities
In this section we will provicíe a characterization of the vectors oC utilitics that correspond
to st.ricl.ly posil.ive Walra.ti equilibria, ba.ged on consistency and non-ernptiness.
Since we only want t,o consider strictly positive Walras allocations and their utility
vectors, we introduce Lhe notation
W}t(E) - W(F') f1 R~}13
for all l; E ï. Further, wc no longer nced condition (i) of srnoothne~ss, so wc define .~tt
to be thc family of all gencralired economies in P whe,re the agents havc utility functions
that sal,isfy condition (ii) of smoothness. hurther, let CJ}t be thc family oí generalized
economies in .~tt t.hat allow for a strictly positive Walra.4 allocation.
Let F, -(N;(w');EN;(ti`)tEN;U) E~. Wc' define a frmction U~ : A(h') -~ RN(E} by
Ur ~(2`)~EN(t.'}~ -~(14'(x`));EN(F,)~ for every ~ E A(F,). We denote
U(E) -{UE(~) ~ x E A(E)}.
A u-solution on E is a function r(~ on !r that assigns to each E E E a subset tli(E) of
U(E). The u-Walras corrrspondence is defined by
uW(~;) - {(~`(~`))iEN(F,) I (2');EN(E} E Wtt(r)}
fur all !s E ir.
In the next lernma we show that we can enlighten utility vectors corresponding to strictly
positive Walras allocations. Lemma 5.1 is a modified 'ancestors property' for the u-
Walras correspondence (see Peleg et al. (1994)).
Lemma 5.1 Let E- (N; (w`);EN; (u');EN; O) E G}t, x E W}}(E) and p E ~ such
that a' E D'(p) for each i E N. Then there exists a generalized economy É- (N U
{0}; (w');ENu{o}; (u`)tENu{o}; 0) E G~t with the property that uW(É) - {v}, where
vo - pwo and v` - u'(x') for all i E N.
Prooj. Pick an agent 0~ N and endow this agent with a utility function uo such that
uo(y) - py for all y E R~. Further, the initial endowment of agent 0 is some wo E R}t.
We enlarge the econorny E by adding agent 0, so that we obtain the economy
('. - (N U {~}; (7U')~ENu(u); (r~`)iENU(11); ~Í).
Notc lhat (,y');ENu{u) -- (rcra,a~,...,~n) is a Wxlras allocation for !s, bccause y' E U'(p)
for each i E N U {0}. This implies that (pwo, (u`(x'));EN) E uW(E).
'I'o prove the other inclusion (uW(É) C{(pwo,(u'(x'));EN)}), we will first show that a
price vector p' ~ p does not supporL a strictly positive Walras allocation for econorny E.
IVotice that agent 0 has a linear utility function. '1'his implies that for a price vector p' ~
p, an allocation y E Do(p') has the property that yk - 0 for at least one k E{1,...,!}.
Hence, for each price vector p' ~ p it holds that Do(p') n Rt} - 0. Now, the proof is
concluded by noting that UÉ(y) - UE(z) for all Walras allocations y and z for economy
Is that are supported by price vector p. ~14
In t.he proof of Icrnrna ~i.l wc use a linear utility firnction. Clearly, this utility function
docs noL satisfy condition (i) of smoothness. lt is for this reason LhaL wc havc to restricl.
to strictly positive Walras allocations.
In order to characterize the u-Walras correspondence, we need the following three axioms.
A u-solution a(r on a family Eo C E satisfies non-emptiness (NEM) if r~(E) ~ 0 for every
EEEo.
A u-solution r~ on a farnily Po C E is Pareto optima! (PO) if for every E E Eo and
every v E r~(E) all x E A(E) with UE(x) - v are efficient allocations. Note that this is
equivalcnt to saying thaL for every E E~o and every v E~(E) it holds that there is no
xllocal.ion y E A(E) suc'h t.hat u'(y) ? v' for all i E N([s') with st.ricL inequality for at
Icast onc i E N(!s).
A u solution r(~ on a fanrily Ecr C~ is consislenl (CON,S) if for all Is E ïcr and all
v E~(r) the following condition is satisfied. If x E A(G) is such that UE(x) - v, then
ES~~ E Eo and (v');ES E r~(Es~s) for all S C N(E), S~ 0.
Theorem 5.2 'I'he u-Walras correspondence is tlre unique u-solution on ~~} that sat-
isfies NF,M, PO, and CONS.
ProoJ. It is easily verified that the u-Walras correspondence satisfies NEM and PO
on Gtt. Consistency of the u-Walras correspondence on G}t follows from the observation
that if ~ E W(E) and y E A(E) such that UE(y) - UE(x), then y E W(E) (this is a
we.ll-known property of the Walras allocations, sce e.g. the non-discrimination axiom in
Naynhisn ( I 99I )).
Now, Iet i~i bc~ a u-solyd,ion on C'j~tthat satisfies t.he thrc~ axioms and let E E~t}. ff
~N( f;)~ - I, t.hou ~A(ls)~ - ~U(E)~ - 1 and by NF'M uW(E) -~i(G) - U(F). If
~N(L;)~ ? 2, Ict v E r~i(Ii) and x E A(G) such LhaL UE~(x) - v. '1'hen, by PO of r~r,
x is an efficient allocation. Also, x' E A(E{'}~) and, by CONS of r~, UEt~y,~(x') -
v` E r~(E{`},~) for all i E N(E). Because E{'}~r is a one-agent economy, this implies
that v` E uW(E{'}~s) and, hence, x' E Wt}(E{;},r) for all i E N(E). Now, lemma 3.4
irnplies that x E W~f(~-). Hence, v- UE(x) is in uW(E). Thus, r~(E) C uW(E) for
all E E G}}.
Wc s}rall use lemma fi.l to prove that uW(E) C~(E) for all E E~t}. Let E E Gtt
and let v E uW(E). Choose x E W}t(E) such that v- UE(x). Further, let p E 0 be
a price vector such that x` E D'(p) for each i E N(E). Consider the economy É that
wc defined in lemma ~i.l. h'or t.his economy we have uW(E) - {v}, where u- pwol5
and ii` - u'(x') for all i E N(E). Since r~(E) C uW(F,), it follows by NEM of r~ that
~i(L;) -{v}. Ilunce, by C'ONS' of ~~, wc know that v is au clcrncut of ~r of the nduccd
rconomy of l; with respcct to N(E) and (m~,(x');EN(gl). '1'his reduced economy is the
cxonorny !;. Ilcncc, wc concJudc that v E tlr(Is). ~
6 Economies with free disposal of commodities
If we assurne that commodities are íreely disposable, then we have to consider for a
generalized economy E-(N; (wi)iEN; (ui);EN; O) the set of allocations
A~(E) -{(x');EN ~ x' E Rt for all i E N, ~ x' G~ w` -1- O}
iEN iEN
and, correspondingly, a solution on a farnily Eo C E is a function ~ that assigns to each
economy E E Eo a subset ~(E) of Af(E).
Pareto optimal allocations and Walras allocatiorrs are defined with respect to the set of al-
locations A~(G) and, correspondingly, we denote these solutions by PO~(E) and W~(E)
respectively. The definitions of the Pareto optimal solution and the Walras correspon-
clence~ are straightforward generalizations of the definitions we provided in section 2 and
thercfore we will not repeat them.
A strikirrg difference betweerr tlre approach without free disposal and the approach with
free disposal is that Walras allocations need no longer be Pazeto optimal if there is free
disposal. This is shown in the following example.
Example 6.1 Let E be a two-agent economy with two goods. 'I'he initial endowment
oí agent 1 is w' -(1, 1), i.e. agent 1 is endowed with 1 unit of the first good and one
unit of the second good, and the initial endowment of agent 2 is w2 -(2, 1). The utility
functions of agents 1 and 2 are given by ur(xr,x2) - 2x~ ~- xZ and u~(x~, xz) - xr -~ 2x2,
respcrct.ively. '1'he net, Irade vector for the economy is O-(-1,2). A Walras allocation
o[ this economy is given by i' -(2,0) and ~2 -(0,3). 'Phe corresponding price vector
is p-(~, Z). The allocation y E A(L') defined by y' -(2, 0) and y2 -(0, 4) satisfies
u~(,y~) - u~(~') and uz(zjt) ~ u~(~2). llence, the Walra.g allocation i is not efíicie.nt.
Clearly, the non-efficiency oÍ the Walras allocation in example 6.1 is caused by the fact
that in this allocation supply is not equal to demand (it is in the set A~(E)`A(E)),
because it follows [rom our previous results that a Walras allocation in which supply
equals demand, is efficient. It would be interesting to find out for which economies there16
exists a Walras allocation in which supply equals demand. A partial answer to this
question is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 6.2 Let !; E.~ be a generalized economy, x E A~( . F,) a Walras allocation,
and let p E 0 be a price vector such that x' E D'(p) for each i E N. Then the following
two assertions hold:
(r) PU ~ 0.
(tii) lf p0 - 0, then x is Pareto optimal in E and, moreover, E has a Walras allocation
in which supply eyuals demand.
Prooj. Let e-~;EN w' -} O-~;EN x'. Then e E Rt and, consequently, pE 7 0. Further,
by local non satiation pw' - px' for all i E N, and, consequently, pE - p0. This proves
part (i). To prove part (ii), suppose p0 - 0 and let j E N. Then x', x' ~ e E Rt} and,
becausc~ of weak trtonotonic:ity, u'(x' ~-e) 1 ut(x'). However, because P(xt -be) - px', it
holds that u'(x') 1 u'(:r.' fs). Thus, ~d(x'te) - u~(x') and, hc,nce, x' fe E D~(p). So,
we found a Walras allocation, x~ -(x' f e, (x')iEN`{j}), in which supply equals demaud.
Now, 1'areto optimality of x follows by noting that u'(xé) - u'(s') for each i E N and
that, xE is Pareto optimaL ~
Note that for an ordinary economy (O - 0) and all its reduced economies with respect
to some Walras allocation the condition in proposition 6.2 (ii) is satisfied and, hence,
these economies have a Walras allocation in which supply equals demand. Of course,
we do not need proposition 6.2 to see this, because it follows using consistency of the
Walras correspondence.
Since Walras allocations need not be Pareto optimal, we cannot use the axiom PO(2)
in order to characterize the Walras allocations. We have to adapt the axiom PO(2) and
we do it in the following way.
Let E-(N; (w');EN; (u');EN; O) be a generalized economy and let x E A~(E). Then x is
self-e;~icient if x is efficient in the economy (N; (x')iENi (u~)iEN, 0). Hence, an allocation
x is selF-ef6cient if the total amount of commodities that is allocated to the agents
(~;EN x`) cannot, be rc-allocatc~cí in such a way t.hat all agcnts arc at, Ica.gt as wcll off and
one agent is strictly better off. Clearly, Walras allocations are self-cíficient.
Let ïo be a family of generalized economies. A solution ~ on ïo satisfies self-e,(~rciency
jor two-agent generalized economies (SE(2)) if for every two-agent generalized economy
F, E ïo all x E ~(E) are self-efCicient.l7
Now we modify the definitiun of converse consiste~ncy to fit thc situation in which com-
rnoditics are freely disposable. Let Eo be a farnily of gencralized cconomics. A solution
~ on Eo satisfies converse consistency (COCONS) ií for every E E Eo with at least two
agents (~N(E)~ ~ 2) and for every x E A~(E) that is self-efficient the following condi-
tion is satisfied.-If for every S C N(E), S~{~,N(E)}, it holds that ES~~ E Eo and
xs E~(Es.s), then x E~(E).
The following result is easily obtained by making slight adaptations in the proof of
theorem 3.6.
Theorem 6.3 The Walras correspondence is the unique solution on .~ that satisfies
NMEX(1), .SE(2), CONS and COCONS.
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